This study examines the economic rationale for limiting firms' risk. We argue that risk increases the cost of doing business for two reasons. First, risk causes operating inefficiencies and imposes adjustment costs. Second, diverse stakeholders must be compensated for their risk-bearing. We find empirical support for positive risk-cost relations using various model specifications and risk measures, and across different manufacturing industries and time periods. We also examine the direct and moderating effects of bankruptcy risk.The relation of distance from bankruptcy to firms' costs depends on whether relations are contemporaneous or lagged and whether bankruptcy is an immediate threat or not.
Risk has long been recognized as a central construct in strategic management (Bowman, 1980; Bettis, 1983) . Among strategic management researchers, risk generally refers to the variability or downside variability of firms' performances. The proxies used in empirical strategic management research (e.g. variance or standard deviation of accounting returns) reflect this understanding of risk (Bromiley et al., 2001; Miller and Reuer, 1996) .
The reasons for general managers' interest in limiting firms' risk remain in dispute. This study begins by summarizing theoretical perspectives in finance and strategic management that seek to address why risk matters to managers and shareholders. Parting company with much of the existing research, we assert that risk adversely affects all stakeholders, including diversified shareholders. There are two supporting arguments for this claim. First, risky firms suffer operating inefficiencies and incur adjustment costs. Second, diverse stakeholders require compensation for bearing the risks associated with their firm-specific income streams and investments. For both of these reasons, reducing risk can be consistent with the interests of shareholders, even when they themselves are risk-neutral.
We present a series of empirical tests examining our core proposition that risk increases firms' costs. Our tests involve various risk and cost measures, and control for industry, firm and time effects on costs. Evidence from a wide range of manufacturing firms and different time periods supports our proposition. These findings point towards an economic rationale for managers' efforts to limit risk. We also examine the direct and moderating effects of proximity to bankruptcy.
There are several unique aspects to this study. First, our theoretical arguments consider the full range of organizational stakeholders. Most previous research on risk has considered only the perspectives of shareholders or managers. Second, we focus on the effect of risk on firms' costs, rather than returns. Although risk-return relations have been widely studied (see Bromiley et al., 2001) , this study shifts attention to firms' cost structures. Third, we consider both variability and downside measures of income-stream risk. Fourth, we consider how the threat of bankruptcy relates to firms' costs.
Rationale for limiting risk
Why do managers seek to limit business risk? Summarizing research in finance and strategic management, Amit and Wernerfelt (1990) highlighted three possible rationales: first, an agency motive; second, a rate-of-return motive; and third, a cash-flow motive. Here we briefly summarize the first two and elaborate on the third.
The agency motive follows agency theory and portfolio theory arguments to conclude that hedging business risk conflicts with the interests of shareholders. Risk matters to managers because they have made irreversible firm-specific human capital investments and their incomes are tied to their organizations' performances. This generally encourages risk aversion (Stulz, 1984) . Managers seek to avoid financial performance volatility as well as bankruptcy. Unlike managers, shareholders can diversify their investment portfolios. Portfolio theory (Lintner, 1965; Markowitz, 1959; Sharpe, 1964) claims that well-diversified investors care only about systematic risk, which remains after diversification. Diversified investors are indifferent about firm-specific unsystematic risk. To the extent that hedging unsystematic risk uses up organizational resources, such practices conflict with the interests of shareholders.
The rate-of-return motive holds that poorly diversified investors are willing to accept lower expected rates of return in exchange for lower unsystematic risk. Chatterjee et al. (1999) argued that, contrary to portfolio theory, shareholders are poorly diversified and, as such, unsystematic risk affects firms' costs of capital (see also Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994) . According to this explanation, the equity cost of capital is the key link between firms' risk and financial performance.
Neither the agency motive nor the rate-of-return motive explains why welldiversified investors would support risk reduction by management. Rather, they holders (e.g. managers, employees, suppliers and buyers) cannot as readily hedge the risks they face in transacting with a firm, because search and transaction costs may prevent it. Insurance policies and the hedging instruments traded in financial markets generally do not address the particular risks they face.
Furthermore, limits on the range of feasible individual and organizational activities narrow the possibilities for diversification. For managers and employees diversification opportunities are often very limited. Constraints on time and attention compel human capital investments to be focused and preclude broad diversification. Managers and employees generally receive a disproportionate amount of their incomes from a single source (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990) . Although suppliers can diversify, gaining each new client involves search costs and relationship-specific investments. This is true for buyers as well. Inputs from different suppliers may be poor substitutes. Buyers face switching costs when adding alternative suppliers. Because of the limited possibilities for diversification and the related costs, many stakeholders can hedge only partially the risks associated with doing business with a firm.
Our elaboration of the cash-flow motive has several distinctive features. First, it reflects a contractual view of the firm (Alchien and Demsetz, 1972; Hart and Holmström, 1987 ). An important aspect of the contracts between firms and their stakeholders is compensation for risk-bearing. Stakeholder demands for such compensation provide an economic rationale for risk reduction by firms. In contract theory research, Shavell (1979) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) developed models demonstrating that risk-neutral shareholders should be interested in reducing firm-specific risk because it affects the compensation required by risk-averse managers.
Second, our argument goes beyond the risk preferences of managers and acknowledges multiple stakeholders. This perspective integrates strategic management research on the stakeholder view (e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones and Wicks, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997) and risk. Jemison (1987) , Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) , Bromiley (1990), and Reuer (1996) have called attention to the differing views of organizational risk held by diverse stakeholders. By virtue of their firm-specific investments, stakeholders have reasons to be averse to performance volatility and, especially, downside results. Aaker and Jacobson (1990) held that a variety of organizational stakeholders are affected by both systematic and unsystematic risk and require compensation for their risk-bearing. Miller (1998) acknowledged the contract theory arguments in finance, and elaborated this argument from a multiple-stakeholder perspective.
Third, our cash-flow argument does not depend on proximity to bankruptcy. Firms may default on implicit contracts long before they default on explicit contracts (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Deephouse and Wiseman, 2000; Shapiro and Titman, 1986) . Hence, stakeholders can incur losses long before the firm is threatened by bankruptcy. Nevertheless, it is possible that proximity to bankruptcy may aggravate the effects of volatility on costs and revenues. Nance et al. (1993) and Smith and Stulz (1985) argued that financial distress increases firms' costs. When bankruptcy occurs, these costs include expenses associated with reorganization (Giddy, 1994; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Trueman and Titman, 1988) . Hence, proximity to bankruptcy may moderate the relation of risk to performance. Performance volatility may be more adverse for firms near bankruptcy than for others.
In summary, Amit and Wernerfelt's (1990) cash-flow motive subsumes two important reasons for the detrimental effects of risk on firms' financial performances. Our first contention is that risk reduces a firm's operating efficiency. Risk-induced reductions in operating efficiency are a deadweight loss borne directly by shareholders. Our second contention, that diverse stakeholders demand compensation for risk-bearing, reflects contract theory and stakeholder views. Shareholders indirectly bear the costs of transferring risk to other stakeholders. These costs show up in the inducements included in stakeholder contracts.
Neither of these arguments invokes agency problems or assumes undiversified investors. We could assume that shareholders costlessly diversify their portfolios and monitor managers' actions, yet there would still remain compelling reasons to limit risk. This is not to say that the cash-flow explanation precludes agency and rate-of-return explanations. These additional arguments and their associated assumptions are simply not necessary for the cash-flow explanation to hold.
The central proposition driving this research is a simple one: risk increases firms' costs. Although we contend that the positive effect of risk on costs should hold across all firms, we are open to the possibility that this effect may increase as firms approach bankruptcy. The standard finance argument holds that financial distress is costly (Nance et al., 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985) . However, others have held that financial distress disciplines managers to improve efficiency (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Wruck, 1990) . For example, managers can use the threat of bankruptcy to negotiate concessions from workers and suppliers, thus driving down costs. Conflicting theoretical arguments regarding the performance implications of financial distress can only be resolved through empirical investigation (Opler and Titman, 1994) .
Past strategic management research has not directly tested our general proposition. Amit and Wernerfelt (1990) reported a negative correlation between unsystematic risk and firm value (Tobin's q) in correlation and multivariate analyses. This is an interesting finding, but their chosen risk measure does not directly reflect the risks of interest to stakeholders other than poorly diversified shareholders, nor the risks directly controlled by managers. Deephouse and Wiseman (2000) found some support for a negative effect of the interaction of risk and proximity to bankruptcy (Altman's Z) on ROA, but their results differed across time periods. In these studies the dependent variables reflect financial returns, which are less relevant to testing our proposition than cost variables.
Research design
The empirical section of this study examines the relations between measures of firms' risk relevant to a broad range of stakeholders and costs, controlling for other factors. Specifying models relating risk to costs forces us to be more precise than the wording of our central proposition. We specify models to examine lagged and contemporaneous relations of risk on costs, and whether bankruptcy risk affects firms' costs.
Models
Using panel data (pooled cross-section and time-series observations), we estimated a series of fixed effects regression models. The models include indicator variables for each individual firm and for each time period. By including firm and period effects, we avoid having to include a variety of control variables for firm-specific and economy-wide influences on costs (e.g. strategy, operational and environmental effects).
Our basic model (model 1) estimated the effect of risk in the previous twoyear period (R i,t-1 ) on firms' operating cost ratios in the following two-year period (C i,t ):
(1) C j,t is the contemporaneous average cost for industry j. t is the time period effect for t = 2,...,10. The remaining terms represent firm effects (␣ i ) and idiosyncratic errors (ε i,t ). Whether risk affects costs immediately or with a time-lag is an open question. As noted by Miller and Leiblein (1996) , existing theory does not precisely specify the appropriate lag structure for risk effects. 2 Although some effects of risk may show up quickly in a firm's cost structure, it may take time for other effects to be realized fully. Operating inefficiencies brought on by risk show up in current costs, but there may be a delay before stakeholders can renegotiate compensation for risk-bearing. Model (1) assumes that differences in lagged risk change subsequent firm-specific costs. To further examine the time structure of the effects of risk on firms' costs, we also estimated a variant of model (1) that includes contemporaneous risk (R i,t ):
As noted earlier, some researchers have argued that the effect of risk on performance is particularly detrimental as firms approach bankruptcy. This suggests a possible moderating effect of financial distress on the relation between risk and costs. As a proxy for distance from bankruptcy, we used Altman's (1983) Z scores. Models (3) and (4) are variants of model (1) that include direct effects of lagged distance from bankruptcy (Z i,t-1 ) and interaction effects of this variable with lagged risk (R i,t-1 Z i,t-1 ):
In keeping with our exploratory approach towards temporal relations, we also considered variants of models (3) and (4) with contemporaneous risk and distance from bankruptcy:
Of course, we must be cautious about interpreting models specifying contemporaneous relations. The direction of causality is ambiguous in these cases. Temporal ordering of variables does not prove causality, but it does help us rule out reverse causality (Kenny, 1979: 2-4) . Models with lagged effects -models (1), (3) and (4) -are consistent with the causal direction of our arguments, but may give managers time to make operational and strategic changes that distort the direct effect of risk on costs. Hence, the models with contemporaneous effects -models (2), (5) and (6) -can provide important evidence regarding risk-cost relations, even though causal claims from such evidence may not be appropriate.
Sample and variables
We used S&P Compustat industrial, full coverage, and research data for our study. Compustat contains annual and quarterly corporate-level operational and financial information for all publicly-traded US companies. Compustat's research database contains companies deleted from the other two databases due to bankruptcies, acquisitions or mergers, leveraged buyouts, or because they became private companies. Because of our interest in examining the effects of proximity to bankruptcy, it was important to include these firms.
We selected our sample based on four criteria.
1 We selected only manufacturing companies, which have four-digit SIC codes from 2000-3999, to keep the industry backgrounds similar. Although our theoretical arguments are not exclusive to manufacturing firms, previous empirical risk-return research has often focused on these firms (Bromiley, 1991; Miller and Bromiley, 1990; Miller and Leiblein, 1996) . We do the same to allow comparisons with prior research. 2 We excluded inactive firms, defined as those with at least one quarter of sales below $250,000 in any given year. Thus, all of the sample firms have annual total sales of at least $1 million. Although this criterion eliminates some very small firms that might be representative observations, firms with very low or no sales can have extreme cost-to-sales ratios. 3 We excluded diversified companies in order to control for shifts in production across lines of business that may affect firms' costs over time. We considered a company diversified if Compustat reported more than one four-digit SIC code for it. 4 We excluded firms that had merger or acquisition events during the sample period. For our models, mergers and acquisitions present problems. Lagged indicators of risk and proximity to bankruptcy are no longer valid predictors if firms engage in mergers and acquisitions, nor can we assume stable firm effects (␣ i ). Compustat reports merger and acquisition events on an annual basis.
We used over two decades of data ranging from 1978 to 2001. To match the two-year period for the risk measures, we computed average cost variables over two years also. We had ten periods corresponding to the times of our dependent variables, plus one period of lagged data from 1980 to 1981. As explained below, computing the downside risk measures for 1980-1 required target level proxies based on 1978-9 data. Firms without complete data for estimating any two-year model were eliminated from the sample for that period. Table 1 profiles the pooled sample. There were 15,464 (firm-year) observations across the ten periods. The major four-digit industry categories were electronic and equipment (19.6% of the sample), instruments and related products (17.7%), industrial machinery and equipment (17.6%), and chemicals and allied products (14.0%).
Cost variables
We chose to focus on two cost ratios: cost of goods sold/sales (COGS) and sales, general and administrative cost/sales (SGA). These variables represent broad categories encompassing the major costs of running a business. They also encompass the costs associated with many stakeholder relationships. Cost of goods sold includes input and production costs. Suppliers and employees involved in operations are the key stakeholders whose compensation makes up COGS. Sales, general and administrative cost reflects the cost of managing business operations and generating sales. Hence, SGA includes the costs associated with maintaining relationships with managers, support staff, the sales force and customers. Dividing costs by sales adjusts for firms' size, making cross-sectional comparisons possible. We used the average of two years of annual cost/sales data for our measures. We eliminated outliers with cost/sales ratios that were negative or above four standard deviations from the means in any given period.
In keeping with the contractual perspective, it would be interesting to consider a more detailed breakdown of costs corresponding to specific stakeholder groups. However, the lack of disaggregated cost data within Compustat meant that we had to settle for broader cost categories -COGS and SGA -encompassing the cash flows associated with many stakeholders.
As shown in Table 1 , the cost ratios vary considerably across industries. For example, the median values for cost of goods sold/sales (COGS) are as low as
0.52 in instruments and related products (SIC 38) and as high as 0.88 in petroleum and coal products (SIC 29). Sales, general and administrative costs/sales ratios (SGA) range from 0.07 in petroleum and coal products (SIC 29) and primary metal products (SIC 33) to 0.41 in instruments and related products (SIC 38). These differences support including industry average cost as a control variable in our regressions.
Risk variables
Strategic management researchers commonly use the variance or standard deviation of historical accounting returns to measure firm risk (Bromiley et al., 2001; Miller and Bromiley, 1990) . Accordingly, we chose the standard deviation of ROA, computed from eight quarters of performance data. Any quarterly return beyond four standard deviations above or below the period mean ROA was treated as an outlier and excluded when computing the risk measures. Such quarterly outlier ROA observations reflect extraordinary items in a firm's accounts, which, if retained, would distort the measured risk for that two-year period. Applying this criterion eliminated less than 0.1% of quarterly ROA observations. Managers and other stakeholders may be more concerned about downside risk than total variability (Baird and Thomas, 1990; March and Shapira, 1987; Miller and Leiblein, 1996; Miller and Reuer, 1996) . Thus, we constructed a root lower partial moment (RLPM) measure. As with the variability measures, we computed the downside risk measure using eight quarters of data:
where the target return ( i,t ) is the four-digit industry average ROA from the previous two-year period, and ROA i,q is firm i's return in quarter q = 1,...,8 of period t. This measure is also termed 'target semideviation' because it captures the downside variation in performance relative to the target. Using the previous two-year industry average ROA as the target return is consistent with previous research suggesting managers form aspirations as linear combinations of ownfirm past performance and the performance of a reference set of firms (Cyert and March, 1963: 123) . To avoid potential small sample biases when computing industry averages, we excluded industries with less than five firms. Earlier, we argued that volatility in a firm's operations creates inefficiencies and imposes adjustment costs. Many stakeholders may have a greater interest in the volatility of the firm's operations than they do in the volatility of financial returns. Suppliers and employees may be particularly concerned about the adjustment costs associated with variations in sales. Sales reductions may threaten suppliers and employees with termination of their relationships with the firm. When sales rise suddenly, the unanticipated demands may place costly strains on employees and suppliers. Buyers may experience frustrating delays in product delivery. To consider the possibility that sales volatility affects firms' costs, we included the coefficient of variation of sales as a risk measure. The coefficient of variation of sales, CV(Sales), was computed from quarterly data as the standard deviation of sales divided by mean sales over a two-year period.
Downward shifts in production may have greater effects on operating efficiency and adjustment costs than upward shifts. Furthermore, some stakehold-
ers -particularly employees and suppliers -may be more averse to downward shifts in production than upward shifts. To reflect this perspective on risk, we included a downside measure based on sales data. Our measure is the ratio of the second-order root lower partial moment of sales to average sales, computed over eight quarters. The mean-adjusted root lower partial moment (MRLPM) was computed as RLPM(Sales)/Mean(Sales), or:
where i,t is the average quarterly sales for firm i from the previous two-year period. As with the coefficient of variation, dividing the sales RLPM by mean sales adjusts for firm size. None of these four risk measures makes adjustments for seasonality in the quarterly data. Our measures capture total variability, or downside variability, not just deviations around trends. As we argued earlier, even when firm-level fluctuations are predictable, stakeholders face adjustment costs and potential losses of firm-specific investments. Hence, we chose risk measures that encompass both predictable and unpredictable aspects of performance volatility.
Altman's Z
To examine the moderating effect of bankruptcy risk on firms' costs, we used Altman's Z scores. Altman's Z is defined as (1.2 × working capital divided by total assets) + (1.4 × retained earnings divided by total assets) + (3.3 × earnings before interest expense and taxes divided by total assets) + (0.6 × market value of equity divided by total liabilities) + (1.0 × sales divided by total assets) (Altman, 1983) . We computed average Z scores using the firm-specific end-ofyear data for the two years in a period. Altman's Z measures the distance from bankruptcy. Therefore, the lower the Z value the higher the likelihood of bankruptcy. There were a few extreme Z values so we eliminated as outliers any observations that exceeded the mean Z values in a given period by plus or minus four standard deviations.
Industry average costs
As already seen in Table 1 , different industries have different cost structures (Lev, 1969) . We included a contemporaneous industry average cost (COGS or SGA) variable in each of our models. We defined industries according to fourdigit SIC categories. We used unweighted industry average costs, computed by deleting the observation firm data (i.e. there are no own-firm effects on industry average costs).
Results
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the pooled data. The table includes both contemporaneous and lagged variables, as in models (1) Table 3 presents the ordinary least squares results for panel data models (1) and (2). In general, the findings are consistent with our main proposition. For model (1), the results show significant positive relations between the lagged risk variables and the cost variables. Model (2) adds the contemporaneous risk variable. The coefficients for both contemporaneous risk and lagged risk are positive and significant in all eight models, regardless the measures of risk or cost. The results are consistent with our main proposition that firms' risk increases operating costs.
Models without bankruptcy risk
In each model, we controlled for industry, firm-specific and time effects. The industry average cost variable is significant (p Ͻ.10) in 13 out of 16 regressions. Although we do not report the specific coefficients for the indicator variables, separate F tests for null period effects ( t = 0 for t = 2,...,10) and null firm effects (␣ i = 0 for all firms) were rejected for all 16 regressions.
We were concerned that autocorrelated errors could distort our hypotheses tests. The Baltagi and Wu (1999) locally best invariant (LBI) statistics for the regressions in Table 3 ranged from 2.05 to 2.17, indicating little reason for concern about AR(1). 3 As a further check to see whether autocorrelation was a problem, we ran the regressions in Table 3 using generalized least squares under the assumption of AR(1). The GLS results were very consistent with the reported OLS results; just one lagged risk coefficient and one contemporaneous risk coefficient (out of 24) became insignificant. The loss of sample size associated with using GLS was another consideration favoring OLS estimation. 4 We also were interested in knowing whether positive risk-cost relations held within industries. We estimated models (1) and (2) for each of the four largest industry subsamples (SIC = 28, 35, 36, 38) composing over two-thirds (69%) of our total sample. In general, the results of the 64 regressions (16 models by four industries) were consistent with the results in Table 3 . The results showed positive relations between risk and costs, although in a few instances, these relations were insignificant (p Ͻ.10). 5
Models with bankruptcy risk
To examine the effect of bankruptcy risk, we incorporated our measure of distance from bankruptcy (Altman's Z) and its interaction with firms' risk. Complete results for models (3)-(6) can be found in the Appendix. Table 4 summarizes the coefficients for the key variables of interest. Each cell gives the number of regressions (out of eight possible) in which a particular coefficient was positive, negative, or not significantly different from zero (p Ͻ.10). 6 The top half of Table 4 presents the results for models (3) and (4), which specify lagged effects of risk and distance from bankruptcy. The lower half of the table presents the results for models (5) and (6), which specify contemporaneous effects. We began by estimating the four models using the full dataset (see the lefthand side of Table 4 and Table A1 in the Appendix). Three results stand out. First, there is a consistent positive relation between risk and costs. This relation holds up irrespective of the choice of risk and cost measures, and whether the specification is lagged or contemporaneous. Second, distance from bankruptcy has a negative contemporaneous relation to costs. The contrasting results for Z in the contemporaneous models (5 and 6) and the lagged models (3 and 4) suggest that the current threat of bankruptcy increases costs, but firms closer to bankruptcy are less likely to experience subsequent increases in costs, possibly due to managers' efforts to contain costs when facing financial distress. Third, there is no consistent relation between the interaction term and costs.
The ambiguous results for the interaction terms led us to question whether generalizing our model relations across all firms was appropriate. We speculated that among firms most threatened by bankruptcy, reductions in bankruptcy risk may be associated with significant reductions in costs. Because of the saliency of bankruptcy risk for the stakeholders of these organizations, we might also find distance from bankruptcy has a significant moderating effect on risk-cost relations. For firms not directly threatened by bankruptcy, these effects may be less evident. To explore these possible contrasts, we divided the sample into two subsamples: one consisting of firms with Altman's Z scores among the lowest 10% in a given year; and the other consisting of the remaining 90% of firms not directly threatened by bankruptcy. 7 We estimated both our contemporaneousand lagged-effects models by subsample (see Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix for details).
The center portion of Table 4 summarizes the results for the bankruptcythreatened subsample. The significant coefficients for the interaction effects in models (4) and (6) are all negative. The negative interaction terms are consistent with the contention that risk becomes more costly as firms approach bankruptcy; however, when compared with the magnitude of the main effect coefficients, the interaction effects are weak. The coefficients on the main effect of distance from bankruptcy shift from negative in the contemporaneous models (5 and 6) to positive in the lagged models (3 and 4). Among firms threatened by bankruptcy, approaching bankruptcy is associated with higher current costs but lower subsequent costs.
The right-hand portion of Table 4 gives the results for the subsample of firms not immediately threatened by bankruptcy. Models (4) and (6) generally show positive coefficients for the interaction term. Where we see a difference between the lagged and contemporaneous models is in the coefficient on the main effect of Altman's Z. The contemporaneous effect is negative; the lagged effect is less consistent, but often positive. Examining the relative magnitudes of the Z i,t and Z i,t × R i,t coefficients for model (6) indicates that the predominant effect is the negative main effect, with only modest marginal attenuation of this effect as risk (R i,t ) increases. Thus, the contemporaneous relation of distance from bankruptcy to costs is negative, but the lagged relation tends to be positive. The subsample analyses produced statistically significant interactions with contrasting signs for the two subsamples, but the magnitudes of these effects relative to the main effects are quite small. The key findings from the subsamples analyses are: 1 negative contemporaneous relations between distance from bankruptcy and costs for both subsamples; 2 positive relations between lagged distance from bankruptcy and costs, with stronger evidence for bankruptcy-threatened firms than for other firms; and 3 positive effects of risk on costs in both subsamples.
The first finding is consistent with the assertion that proximity to bankruptcy increases firms' costs. The second finding suggests firms are increasingly vigilant about containing subsequent costs the closer they are to bankruptcy. The third finding supports our general proposition that risk increases firms' costs.
Discussion
This study advances our understanding of the implications of firms' risk in several important ways. First, we clarified Amit and Wernerfelt's (1990) cash-flow motive for managing risk. Our discussion distinguished two effects of risk: (1) operating inefficiencies and adjustment costs; and (2) costs imposed by stakeholders demanding compensation for risk-bearing. Our contention that firms' risk increases costs has received little acknowledgement in strategic management research. Amit and Wernerfelt (1990) , Aaker and Jacobson (1990) , Miller (1998) , Deephouse and Wiseman (2000) , and Wang et al. (2003) are among the few strategic management researchers who acknowledge that diverse stakeholders demand compensation for risk-bearing. The present study goes beyond their discussions by elaborating and clarifying the relevant theoretical arguments, and providing direct empirical evidence explaining firms' costs.
Whether considering simple correlations or various multivariate models, our findings regarding risk-cost relations were quite robust and consistent with the general proposition that risk increases firms' costs. This relation holds when controlling for contemporaneous industry average cost, as well as period and firm effects. Both contemporaneous and lagged risk are positively associated with firms' costs. We verified that positive risk-cost relation holds within distinct industries as well as in the full panel dataset.
There is no universal risk-cost lag structure. Cost ratios in certain industries (e.g. those with high fixed costs or time-sensitive products) may be more immediately and adversely affected by process flow variability than others. The distinct abilities of stakeholders to dictate or renegotiate their contractual terms with firms may affect the lag structures of risk-cost relations. We still need to carefully elaborate the processes involved in such cost adjustments. This involves taking a closer look at stakeholder management processes in contexts of changing risk. We also need to sort out how much the changes in costs reflect operating inefficiencies and adjustments made by firms as compared with stakeholders' demands for additional compensation.
It is important to note that the cost measures considered in this study -COGS and SGA -exclude financing costs. We did not directly test Chatterjee et al.'s (1999) proposition that risk reduces financial performance by increasing the cost of capital. Rather, we showed that the mediating effect of the cost of capital is not necessary to generate positive risk-cost relations.
We also considered whether proximity to bankruptcy affects firms' costs. We found that costs are negatively related to contemporaneous distance from bankruptcy. The lagged effect, however, is positive, suggesting that the more financially distressed a firm, the greater the efforts to contain subsequent costs. Although there were some statistically significant interactions between risk and Altman's Z for each subsample (bankruptcy-threatened and remainder), the magnitude of these effects was always small relative to the main effects.
Although this study provides initial evidence consistent with our contention that risk increases costs, more direct tests using other data could be helpful. An important direction for extending this study would be to examine particular risks of concern for different stakeholders (Miller and Bromiley, 1990; Miller and Reuer, 1996) and their implications for organizations' costs. Researchers could study changes in contractual terms associated with changes in specific risks. For example, we could examine employees', management's and suppliers' contractual terms after shifts in firms' risk. Other risk measures beyond those used here could be incorporated into such studies. For example, we have not considered the effects on operating costs of bond rating adjustments or risk measures based on stock analysts' earnings forecasts (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996) . Using the coefficient of variation of stock analysts' earnings estimates (Miller and Reuer, 1996) would allow us to test the effects of ex ante performance unpredictability.
This study provides one piece of an economic rationale for hedging risk. The piece still missing is a comparison of the costs of alternative hedging steps managers can take to reduce risk. Miller (1992 Miller ( , 1998 presented financial and strategic hedging as complementary approaches to managing firm risk. Finance researchers have detailed the use of financial instruments (futures and forward contracts, options and swaps) to hedge volatile cash flows. By comparison, our current understanding of the risk implications of alternative strategies is still rather crude. Firms may divest high-risk activities or diversify in ways that reduce their risk. Investments in strategic and operational flexibility can also ameliorate risk. Research from a real-option perspective has begun to clarify how flexibility can enhance firm performance (Sanchez, 1993 (Sanchez, , 1995 . We encourage further work in this direction.
Future research should examine how specific changes in strategies associated with risk-taking or risk-hedging affect firms' costs. Such research, clarifying which kinds of strategies are risk-taking and which are risk-averse, and their cost and performance implications, could provide important insights for strategic management theory and practice. We also encourage further research on how organizations alter their strategies in response to risk and financial distress. 
